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Interrogating Copyright History 
Elena Cooper, CREATe, University of Glasgow and Ronan Deazley, 
Queen’s University Belfast 
An understanding of the past – how we got to where we are today – informs the 
approach of much recent scholarship about copyright. The EIPR is no exception: in an 
article published in 2003, one co-author of this article (Ronan Deazley) argued that 
the interpretation of aspects of eighteenth century copyright history – the ruling of the 
House of Lords in Donaldson v Becket in 17741 – had implications for twenty-first 
century policy-making and judicial reasoning. 2  This interest in the past has been 
traced to a ‘historical turn’ in scholarship in the late 1990s, which marked a move 
away from the more forward-looking approach of the earlier twentieth century, when 
lawyers had little time for historical perspectives.3 The climate of renewed scholarly 
interest in copyright history in recent decades, amongst other things, has seen the 
launch in 2008 of the AHRC funded digital archive of Primary Sources on Copyright 
History (hosted at www.copyrighthistory.org), now expanded to cover seven 
jurisdictions (Italy, UK, USA, Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands), as well as 
the founding of the International Society for the History and Theory of IP (or 
‘ISHTIP’) which will see its 8th annual workshop in July 2016. That both initiatives 
are linked to CREATe (and so to both co-authors4), the RCUK-funded centre for 
research into copyright, the creative economy, and the future of creative production in 
the digital age,5 illustrates well a current perception that a study of the past is of value 
to those researching the present. 
So, what exactly is the point of copyright history? Is it and should it be considered of 
value to those concerned with copyright law and policy today? These questions were 
fully debated at a two-day symposium hosted by CREATe, University of Glasgow, in                                                              
1 (1774) 1 E.R. 837. 
2 R. Deazley, ‘Re-Reading Donaldson (1774) in the Twenty-first Century and Why it Matters’, 
2003, EIPR 270-79. 
3 See M. Kretschmer, with L. Bently and R. Deazley, ‘Introduction: The History of Copyright 
History: Notes from an Emerging Discipline’ in R. Deazley, M. Kretschmer and L. Bently, Privilege 
and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright (Open Book Publishers, 2010), 2-3.  
4 Ronan Deazley was the Founding Director of CREATe, and Elena Cooper is currently a Post-
doctoral Researcher in Copyright, History and Policy at CREATe. 
5 See the ‘About’ section of the CREATe website, under the title ‘What is CREATe?’ 
(http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/category/about/ accessed in November 2015). CREATe is the joint 
sponsor of the Primary Sources project and the host of ISHTIP’s 2016 workshop. 
March 2015, to which a number of distinguished academics contributed.6 The point of 
departure for the event was the publication of Copyright at Common Law in 1774 by 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui of Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon, USA, 
in the Connecticut Law Review and as a CREATe Working Paper,7 which seeks to 
cast fresh light on the interpretation of Donaldson put forward in Deazley’s 2003 
EIPR article. 
The Debate over Donaldson  
By way of background, the first copyright statute – the Statute of Anne 1710, 
protecting ‘books and other writings’ – provided protection for a limited time only: a 
maximum term of 28 years.8 As statutory copyrights began to expire, one question 
before the courts was whether copyright protection predating the 1710 Act existed at 
common law and, if so, whether that protection was perpetual or was abridged by the 
more limited terms of the statute. In recent years, scholars – principally Howard 
Abrams (a panellist at the symposium event), and Deazley (as detailed in the 2003 
EIPR article) – have interpreted Donaldson to hold that there never was a copyright at 
common law and therefore the origin of copyright was exclusively statutory. This 
reading differs from previous understandings of the case that copyright was an 
inherent right in authors protected at common law and pre-dated the Statute of Anne.  
These divergent scholarly views stemmed from the manner in which the decision in 
Donaldson was reported, as well as differences in understandings as to how the House 
of Lords ruled on appeals at the time of the decision. The view that copyright at 
common law pre-dated the Statute of Anne is rooted, in part, in the belief that the 
majority of the opinions delivered by the judges in Donaldson, was the rule in the 
case. By contrast, the work of Abrams and Deazley draws attention to the widespread 
                                                             
6 The event began with a lecture delivered by Gómez-Arostegui, open to the general public, 
followed by questions from the floor. The following day, Gómez-Arostegui’s paper formed the starting 
point for a roundtable discussion chaired by Hector MacQueen of Edinburgh Law School, with the 
deliberately provocative sub-title: ‘What is the point of copyright history?’ This involved contributions 
from an invited audience of academics, including five distinguished panellists: Howard Abrams of 
University of Detroit Mercy, Lionel Bently of Cambridge University, Oren Bracha of the University of 
Texas, Mark Rose of University of California, Santa Barbara, and Charlotte Waelde of the University 
of Exeter. 
7 (2014) 47 Conn L Rev 1 and CREATe Working Paper 2014/16 (3 November 2014). 
8 The Statute of Anne conferred protection for a period of 14 years and then for a further period of 
14 years if the author was still alive at the end of the first period. 
misreporting of the case and also argues that the opinions delivered by the judges 
were merely advisory; rather the speeches of the Lords were determinative. 
Gómez-Arostegui contends that the account put forward by Abrams and Deazley is 
incorrect: the decision was not misreported and the Lords’ speeches alone cannot 
represent the decision of the House; the opinions of the Law Lords, like those of the 
judges, were not binding on the House of Lords, and the Lords delivered their 
speeches before the vote in the case. Instead, Gómez-Arostegui argues that detailed 
research into the history of the procedures of the House of Lords shows that it was 
only in the nineteenth century, once law reports included the speeches of the Lords 
(after 1814) and also once it was established that lay peers would not vote on judicial 
matters (after 1844) that the speeches of the Lords took on the form of ‘judgments’ in 
the way that we know them today. On this view, the reasoning of the House cannot be 
determined; ‘the House, as a body, did not determine the origin of copyright…’.9 It is, 
in the words of Mark Rose a judicial ‘black hole’.10 
The Debate over Donaldson and the Nature of Academic Research 
When the co-authors of this article were planning the symposium – at that time both 
as academics at CREATe – the idea that Gómez-Arostegui should present his paper in 
a lecture open to the general public appealed; knowledge exchange and public 
transparency is an important component of CREATe’s mission and we both felt that 
the debate over Donaldson exemplifies, in a number of respects, the nature of much 
academic work. These points are well illustrated by the CREATe Working Paper 
providing a lasting record of the event, comprising written responses to Gómez-
Arostegui’s paper by five panellists (Howard Abrams, Lionel Bently, Oren Bracha, 
Mark Rose and Charlotte Waelde), a written reply by Gómez-Arostegui, and an edited 
record of the more general discussions at the symposium.11 
First, the debate over Donaldson speaks to the nature of scholarly research generally, 
as objective, disinterested, evidence-based and open to challenge; access to new 
evidence and source material has the capacity to re-open the debate of issues that                                                              
9 Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common Law in 1774, 6. 
10 Cooper and Deazley, 40. 
11 E. Cooper and R. Deazley (eds), ‘What is the Point of Copyright History? Reflections on 
Copyright at Common Law in 1774 by Tomás Gómez-Arostegui’, CREATe Working Paper 2016/?? 
(DATE). This article is drawn from our Introduction to the Working Paper.  
were previously considered settled. The response of Howard Abrams, for example, 
shows that academic debate over how Donaldson is to be interpreted is set to 
continue; 12 Abrams remains of the view that it is the speeches of the Lords that 
contain the rule of the House. And that is entirely appropriate. As a community, 
academics welcome the emergence of new evidence and new challenges to existing 
theory and orthodoxy, as well as the opportunity to debate and interrogate these 
contested perspectives. Academia is guided by intellectual inquiry, not dogma. 
Secondly, the Donaldson debate reveals the importance of careful attention to context 
in legal-historical work. In Copyright at Common Law in 1774, this involves detailed 
research into the procedures of the House of Lords at the time of Donaldson, which 
cast light on the working of the House, and therefore how the surviving records of the 
decision are to be interpreted. The more general symposium discussion by panellists 
and invited audience,13 uncovered yet more important contexts, which impact on our 
understanding of Donaldson. Comments and questions posed by Bently and Hector 
MacQueen situated Donaldson within the particular constitutional settlement with 
Scotland of the time.14 Those by Jose Bellido drew attention to the law reporting 
context,15 which in turn, as MacQueen noted, affected how the House was understood 
and may have meant that the lay peers voted as a ‘jury of the nation’, to deliver a 
result (the entry of many books into the public domain) that was tremendously 
popular amongst the general population. 16  Oren Bracha, in both his essay and 
contribution to the discussion,17 noted the changing nature and significance of the 
‘common law’ through time which, in turn, he argued, resulted in dynamics in the 
notion of ‘common law copyright’; unlike the period since the twentieth century, 
when the predominant understanding of ‘common law’ was in the positivist sense, of 
judge-made law, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ‘common law’ denoted 
more than this: a natural law reflecting precepts of reason. In addition, MacQueen 
drew attention to more general legal-historical questions about the relationship 
between common law and equity at the time of the decision.18 
                                                             
12 Cooper and Deazley, Chapter 2.  
13 Ibid, Chapter 8. 
14 Ibid, 62 and 63-4. 
15 Ibid, 67-8. 
16 Ibid, 69-70. 
17 Ibid, 33, 72-3 and 75-6. 
18 Ibid, 63-4. 
Thirdly, academic difference about Donaldson demonstrates the importance of 
original material, such as archival and/or other documentary records (e.g. newspapers) 
to legal-historical academic research. As Gómez-Arostegui explained at the 
symposium, he was once a proponent of the account put forward by Abrams and 
Deazley; his reassessment of Donaldson came about after he had obtained and read 
every available record of the case (of which he is aware): every surviving newspaper 
report, as well as rare unpublished manuscript material that might cast light on the 
ruling. This illustrates the importance of unpublished material to academic 
researchers, an issue that a number of contributors to the symposium specifically 
addressed.19  
Copyright, Unpublished Works and Academic Research 
Ironically, barriers to the use of archival material exist today in the form of copyright 
rules that stem historically from the protection of unpublished works at common law, 
one of the issues at the heart of the debate around Donaldson. In short, many types of 
historic archive material – including unpublished literary works such as personal 
correspondence, diaries, notebooks, and so on – are currently protected under UK 
copyright law to 2039,20 however old those works might be. Moreover, the exceptions 
to copyright that permit fair dealing with a work for the purpose of quotation, whether 
for criticism and review or otherwise, only apply to works that have been ‘made 
available to the public’,21 a legal term of art that does not necessarily encompass 
making a work physically accessible for consultation within an archive.  
As one co-author of this article (Deazley) has explored at length elsewhere, that these 
historic records and documents remain in copyright beyond the standard copyright 
term impacts on the scholarly, educational and creative reuse of this material, a 
situation that archivists and academics have often decried as absurd;22 or, to borrow a 
                                                             
19 See e.g. the comments of Jose Bellio at 67-68, or Giles Bergel at 70-71. 
20 Schedule 1, para.12(4) Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. This applies to works created 
by an author who died before 1 January 1969 and were unpublished at the time when the Copyright 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 came into force (1 August 1989). See further R. Deazley and V. Stobo, 
Archives and Copyright: Risk and Reform, CREATe Working Paper 2013/3 (17 March 2013, Version 
1.1 10 April 2013), 6. 
21 s.30(1)(1ZA)(1A) Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
22 See e.g. the comments of Tim Padfield, the former Chair of the Libraries and Archives 
Copyright Alliance, at an event organised by CREATe in September 2013: ‘We’ve been told, and we 
keep being told, that the purpose of copyright is to encourage innovation, to encourage creativity, and 
yet we have a duration of copyright the standard of which is 70 years from the death of the creator. 
turn of phrase from Abrams, investing time and money to clear rights in work that 
was created two, three or four hundred years ago or more, is a prospect that many 
regard as irritating, burdensome and obnoxious.23 In this respect, the work of the 
copyright historian itself raises copyright policy issues today, also the subject matter 
of research at CREATe.24 
What is the Point of Copyright History? 
As well as illustrating facets of academic research, the Donaldson debate provides an 
entry-point into the discussion of the more general question noted at the outset: what 
is the point of copyright history? Gómez-Arostegui – like Deazley’s 2003 EIPR 
article – claims interpreting Donaldson is of significance to contemporary copyright 
law and policy. Writing in a US context, Gómez-Arostegui draws attention to the 
doctrinal and normative relevance of his work to copyright today. First, in the USA, 
judicial interpretation of copyright often rests on a reading of the intellectual property 
clause of the constitution of 1787, empowering Congress ‘to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times’ inter alia ‘to authors… the 
exclusive right’ to their ‘writings’. On this view, Donaldson may be evidence of what 
the Framers and First Congress intended for US copyright policy. Secondly, in certain 
instances, for example, sound recordings fixed before 1972, it is US state common 
law that provides protection; as certain US states adopted the common law of 
England, Donaldson is of doctrinal relevance in those states.  
Finally, Gómez-Arostegui makes a broader claim, which was closely scrutinised in 
the symposium: that history sets the ‘default basis’ for copyright. As he asserts, if 
copyright originated as a common law right, this suggests that ‘the principal purpose 
was to protect authors’, whereas if it originated as a privilege created by statute, this 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Why you are giving the benefits to the grandchildren and the great grandchildren of the creator, in 
order to encourage innovation, I really don’t understand. It makes the 2039 date for the termination of 
copyright in unpublished literary works and some other works even more absurd, which means that 15th 
century works are protected by copyright, even though they weren’t when copyright was created in 
1709. I find it really bizarre’; R. Deazley and V. Stobo (eds), Archives and Copyright: Developing an 
Agenda for Reform, CREATe Working Paper 2014/04 (24 February 2014), 70. 
23 Cooper and Deazley, 22. 
24 See http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/06/02/will-uk-unpublished-works-finally-make-their-
public-domain-debut/ and the following CREATe Working Papers: Deazley and Stobo (eds), Archives 
and Copyright: Developing an Agenda for Reform; V. Stobo, with R. Deazley and Ian G. Anderson, 
Copyright & Risk: Scoping the Wellcome Digital Library Project, CREATe Working Paper 2013/10 
(13 December 2013); Deazley and Stobo, Archives and Copyright: Risk and Reform.  
indicates that copyright should principally benefit the public’.25 In this way, copyright 
history is presented as having a supporting role in normative arguments over the 
proper scope of copyright; it is, in that respect, of relevance to policy-making today, 
particularly in a US context where reference is often made to the ‘original purpose’ of 
copyright.  
This last claim – the normative policy relevance of copyright history to copyright 
policy today – was questioned by a number of contributors to the symposium. Oren 
Bracha, writing from a US standpoint, considered Donaldson to have little bearing as 
a ‘normative basis’ for copyright law. As he expresses in his essay in the Working 
Paper, ‘natural rights theories have power to the extent they are persuasive on the 
merits’; ‘the name of the game is substantive persuasion not authority’.26 Further, 
Charlotte Waelde, a copyright law professor who is also Chair of the Unregistered 
Rights Research Expert Advisory Group to the UK Intellectual Property Office, 
considered Donaldson to be inconsequential to UK copyright policy today; as she 
concludes in her essay, ‘preoccupations are more with the technicalities of the law 
and how changes might impact on stakeholders in contemporary society particularly 
in the context of technological advancement than with the nuances of Donaldson and 
how it might have changed the legal landscape as it stood in 1774’.27   
While doubts were expressed as to the breadth of certain of Gómez-Arostegui’s 
claims, more nuanced and complex aspects of the significance of copyright history 
were identified in the course of the symposium discussion. Lionel Bently’s published 
work with co-author Brad Sherman, for instance, presents eighteenth century debates 
over literary property as a time for the rich debate of ideas about the notion of 
property rights in intangibles,28 a point which is also made in Bently’s Chapter in the 
Working Paper;29 on this view history is a source of ideas and arguments which may 
well be instructive to policy-makers today, amongst others.30  
The cross-disciplinary nature of the audience at the symposium also brought 
copyright history into conversation with the discipline of book history. For Giles                                                              
25 Gómez-Arostegui, Copyright at Common Law in 1774, 1. 
26 Cooper and Deazley, 34. 
27 Ibid, 45. 
28 B. Sherman and L. Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), Chapters 1 and 2. 
29 Cooper and Deazley, 29-30. 
30 Ibid, 80. 
Bergel, a book historian, copyright law is of interest for what it reveals about ‘how the 
market for books was made’.31 This resulted in specific questions about the relation 
between Donaldson and the contemporaneous practices of the book trade and, in turn, 
observations about the relation between law and trade practice more generally. From 
this perspective, Donaldson provides an example of what happens when an 
assumption that law supports a widespread trade practice is displaced; transactions 
that were thought to be enforceable, were suddenly held to be unenforceable. In the 
case of Donaldson, the transactions related to book publishing. In the course of the 
symposium discussion more recent examples were noted: Hector MacQueen drew 
parallels with swap transactions concluded in the City of London in the 1990s, which 
were subsequently held to be unenforceable by the House of Lords,32 and Isabella 
Alexander noted the trade in recent times by the entertainment industry in television 
programme ‘format rights’ despite difficulties with their legal protection. 33 These 
examples, argued Alexander, point to the value of copyright history to the work of 
property theorists. Indeed, as an existing essay on copyright history concludes, 
discussing the lucrative trade in ‘painting copyright’ in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century (prior to the statutory protection of painting in 1862): ‘‘Copyright 
law’ needs to be understood as having been only one mechanism for the articulation 
of proprietary relations: other legal norms (personal property, contract, bailment), 
and, more interestingly, other social norms, allowed for systems of ascription and 
control, flows of money, as well as the transfer and sharing of ideas and expression.’34  
The parallel between past and present in this regard also draws attention to another 
way in which history might be of interest to policy-makers; as Bently argued, research 
into the impact of Donaldson on the practices of the book trade, might well provide 
policy-makers today with empirical evidence of how a change in the law (for 
instance, such that subject matter that was previously thought to be protected, was 
held not to be protected) might affect ‘markets and incentives and payments to 
authors’ amongst other things.35  
                                                             
31 Ibid, 70-1. 
32 Ibid, 70. 
33 Ibid, 75. 
34 Kretschmer, Bently and Deazley, ‘The History of Copyright History’, 6. 
35 Cooper and Deazley, 80. 
Above and beyond all these observations, however, lies the more general ‘point’ to all 
academic scholarship which both co-authors of this article firmly endorse; as Mark 
Rose described, the purpose of history, and we would add the purpose of academic 
scholarship more generally is ‘the advancement of knowledge or advancement of 
understanding’, a purpose which, of course, has its ‘own validation’ as an enquiry in 
its own right.36 
Those wishing to read further about the CREATe Symposium are directed to 
http://www.create.ac.uk/resources/copyright-history-symposium-resource/ where the 
Working Paper, as well as Gómez-Arostegui’s original paper, is available for free 
download.   
                                                             
36 Ibid, 76. 
